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Transitional Justice: History-Telling, Collective Memory, 
and the Victim-Witness
Chrisje Brants, Willem Pompe Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Utrecht University, the Netherlands
Katrien Klep, Department of Cultural Anthropology and Sociology, Utrecht University, the Netherlands
This article examines the complex, inherently political, and often contradictory processes of truth-finding, history-telling, and formation of collective memory 
through transitional justice. It explores tensions between history-telling and the normative goals of truth commissions and international criminal courts, taking 
into account the increasing importance attributed to victims as witnesses of history. The legal space these instruments of transitional justice offer is deter-
mined by both their historical and political roots, and specific goals and procedures. Because the legal space that truth commissions offer for history-telling is 
more flexible and their report open to public debate, they may open up alternative public spaces and enable civil society to contest the master narrative. The 
legal truth laid down in the rulings of an international criminal court is by definition closed. The verdict of a court is definite and authoritative; closure, not 
continued debate about what it has established as the truth, is its one and only purpose. In conclusion, the article calls for a critical appraisal of transitional 
justice as acclaimed mediator of collective memories in post-conflict societies.
In connection with modern society and the construction of 
a common core of memory, it has been observed that: 
“[H]istory and legal institutions supersede and replace rit-
uals and traditions; archives …‚ and bureaucracies provide 
stores of memory; museums and memorials celebrate the 
past. Modern societies need a wide range of different insti-
tutions that store and construct collective memories, and 
do so in differing ways’ (Karstedt 2009, 4). This article is 
concerned with two such legal institutions: international 
criminal courts and truth commissions. Both are instru-
ments of transitional justice, employed in (post)conflict 
societies to support the transition from conflict to peace, 
but their manifest purposes are very different. An inter-
national criminal trial aims to bring to justice perpetrators 
of atrocities by determining what they have done through 
due process of law; the primary concern of truth commis-
sions is to bring justice to victims through publicly estab-
lishing what happened to them. But this obvious difference 
hides a significant similarity: such truth-finding also pro-
motes the development of a collective memory by estab-
lishing a version of history that informs, and is informed 
by, the memories of those involved – a shared truth about 
crime and injustice that allows sense to be made of a trau-
matic past and is a prerequisite for a stable future. Truth, 
collective memory, and history-telling have become 
buzzwords in the transitional justice debate, conceptual 
keys to reconciliation, democracy, and peace in conflict-
ridden nations.
Mark Osiel (1997, 6) maintains that international criminal 
trials are “often a focal point for the collective memory of 
whole nations”; even “secular rituals of commemoration. 
As such, they consolidate shared memories with increasing 
deliberateness and sophistication.” Martha Minow (1998, 
60) has argued that truth commissions “undertake to write 
the history of what happened as a central task,” and that “a 
truth commission may be a more effective mechanism than 
litigation for devising a new national narrative” (Minow 
2008, 180). Truth Commissions then, flatten-out, so to 
speak, complex memories and understandings of the past 
into an inclusive nation-building narrative which they 
envision as a collective memory. And, discussing the cur-
rent (academic) interest in “memory,” Jay Winter (2006, 1) 
refers to “the memory boom … – a wide array of collective 
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mediations on war and the victims of war.” However, he 
takes issue with the ease with which the term “collective 
memory” is employed, as if there were “one national ‘the-
atre of memory’ which we all inhabit” (2006, 185). While 
he makes this point about film as a cultural practice and 
source of collective memories, it is equally true of transi-
tional justice.
According to Winter (2006, 185), it is more constructive to 
see film as “one of the mediators of the memories of par-
ticular groups.” Transitional justice also (re)produces 
memories but aspires to more than that. “Justice” requires 
that the different theatres of memory are collected into one 
“truth” (Osiel’s “coherent collective memory,” Minow’s 
“national narrative”). This means that transitional justice 
can be understood as a mediator between different collec-
tive memories. Moreover, unlike film, this mediator 
embodies the voice of (legal) authority. The version of past 
events that courts and truth commissions produce in their 
verdicts and reports is an authoritative claim of truth.
However, while history-telling and the formation of collec-
tive memory in the name of justice may result in a coherent 
narrative, they are neither neutral nor objective. They are 
dynamic processes grounded in social, cultural, and power 
relations in (international) society at any given time; they 
are coloured by the moment at which the past is con-
sidered, and by how a preferred narrative is promoted. His-
tory and memory change as time goes on, and are never 
“finished.” At the same time, the “truth” established by a 
court or truth commission is based in no small part on the 
testimony of victims, but the flattened, often truncated nar-
rative that combines their memories and stories is, almost 
by definition, unlikely to do justice to their suffering.
This makes the authoritative truth claim of courts and 
truth commissions particularly problematic, given the par-
ameters of their establishment, the limitations of their 
remit, and the other goals of transitional justice: just retri-
bution, redress for victims, reconciliation, deterrence, and 
the establishment of democracy and the rule of law. The 
complex, inherently political and often contradictory pro-
cess of truth-finding, history-telling, and the formation of 
collective memory through transitional justice are the con-
cern of this article. In particular, we explore whether and 
where tensions exist between history-telling and the nor-
mative aims of truth commissions and international crimi-
nal courts and ask how their goals and procedures shape 
the “truth” they produce.
We pay particular attention to the increasing importance 
attributed to victims as witnesses of history and the impact 
this has on transitional justice. We maintain that, given the 
liberal political aspirations of transitional justice and the 
central position of the victim-witness, we would do well to 
take Jay Winter’s warning seriously and adopt a cautious 
and critical stance towards history-telling in transitional 
justice, especially in the case of international criminal 
courts. While truth commissions are by no means without 
problems, we argue that, compared to criminal trials, they 
are by their very nature more open-ended. Although they 
too may fall short in the justice they provide for victims, 
they are also able to pave the way for the development of 
other collective memories and alternative histories.
First we will delve into the historical development of inter-
national criminal justice and the changing position of the 
victim-witness, to reveal tensions between the goals of 
criminal justice and the need for history telling by the 
courts to ensure that what has happened is not forgotten. 
Then we will take a closer look at the position of the vic-
tim-witnesses in truth commissions, and show how vic-
tims’ testimonies are shaped into an official narrative by 
the mandates of the commissions. At the same time, vic-
tims and social organizations contest these official nar-
ratives and open up spaces for ongoing public debate. 
Finally, we examine the potential and limitations of both 
instruments of transitional justice when it comes to his-
tory-telling and the scope for autonomous action they 
afford to the victim-witness.
1. International Criminal Justice: Doing Justice, Making History
1.1. From Arbitrary Vengeance to Due Process of Law
Dealing with the aftermath of conflict through legal pro-
cess was discussed from the post-Waterloo period onward, 
but in particular after the First World War when the Allies 
envisaged that the German Kaiser would face an inter-
national tribunal with a view, among other things, to vin-
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dicating “the validity of international morality” (quoted in 
Bass 2002, 76). Although the trial never materialized, the 
very idea reflects the notion, if embryonic, that war is gov-
erned by an international legal order transcending custom-
ary rules. The specific goals of this undertaking were not 
entirely clear. Retribution and deterrence certainly figured 
in the background. Victims other than the allied nations 
themselves – as they saw it, viciously and illegally attacked 
by an aggressor-state bent on self-aggrandizement – were 
not part of the scheme. The British solicitor-general did 
remark that there “would remain for all time a record of 
German brutality” (quoted in Bass 2002, 302), but history-
telling was not recognized as significant in itself until it 
came to dealing with the crimes committed under Nazi 
rule.
Much has been written about the Nuremberg trials from 
many different perspectives. Most legal scholars now seem 
to agree that their greatest achievement was the recognition 
of crimes against humanity.1 But this is with hindsight. 
Bass (2002) comes much closer to the contemporary mind-
set in regarding Nuremberg as the victory of liberalism, the 
acceptance of the civilized fair trial as better (and more 
effective) justice than arbitrary vengeance. Although Nur-
emberg revealed a mountain of information about crimes 
against humanity these were secondary considerations. The 
needs of individual victims figured not at all, while a form 
of collective victimhood was reserved for (the peoples of) 
the nations attacked by Germany. As in 1919, the Allies 
regarded themselves as victims of a brutal war of aggres-
sion, during which there had “also” been a programme to 
exterminate the Jews. Nuremberg was about retribution for 
the war in general. It was also about deterrence through 
“education” of the German populace. Punishing the 
leaders “in a dignified manner consistent with the advance 
of civilization” served that end,2 but also implied produc-
ing a collectively shared version of history in the face of the 
disparate theatres of memory inhabited by Germans 
immediately after the war.
While we should not try to read too much into Nur-
emberg, there is no doubt that it is part of the ideological 
legacy of the Second World War and as such played a sig-
nificant role in the development of international criminal 
justice. That legacy included the concepts of human 
rights and crimes against humanity as the concern of the 
international community and the legal and organiz-
ational infrastructure needed to ensure that “never again” 
would such a catastrophe befall the world – the United 
Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and, later, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the European Court of Human Rights. 
However, although the notion of a permanent inter-
national criminal court, whose jurisdiction would tran-
scend the sovereignty of the nation state, was mooted 
after the Second World War, it was soon shelved in the 
hostile climate of the Cold War. The idea re-emerged in 
the 1990s, partly as a result of the momentum created by 
the ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a both political 
and idealistic venture in cosmopolitan liberalism and 
human rights (Brants 2011), and global criminal justice has 
become the “new paradigm of the rule of law” (Teitel 2005, 
839).
International criminal justice is said to establish the rule of law 
(therefore easing and legitimizing transition to democracy), 
because it also brings reconciliation, conflict resolution, reha-
bilitation, deterrence, retribution, and because it provides a 
platform for victims, exposes mass-victimization and lends a 
voice to the millions who would otherwise go unheard …, pre-
venting history from being either forgotten or repeated.
(Brants 2007, 185)
Its ultimate aim is therefore “the domestication of violence 
by law, by the establishment of a just peace where the 
wounds of history can, at last, be healed” (Hazan 2010, 
54–55).
1 The very title of the volume From Nuremberg to 
the Hague (Sands 2003) posits direct continuity 
between Nuremberg and prosecutions by the inter-
national ad hoc tribunals and the permanent Inter-
national Criminal Court.
2 Henry Stimson, American secretary of war, 
quoted by Bass (2002, 165).
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1.2. The Victim-Witness and History-Telling
International criminal justice is often lauded as the 
triumph of idealism and civilization over cynicism and 
barbarism. At the same time, international courts have 
come in for a deal of criticism as well. While Osiel (2008) 
contends that international criminal trials, through the his-
tory-telling that is part of the legal construction of a case, 
not only are but should be geared towards the development 
of a coherent collective memory as a means of coming to 
terms with a divisive and painful past, others emphasize 
the essentially political nature of international trials and 
warn that the history-telling involved in the truth-finding 
process is open to abuse for political ends (Alvarez 2004; 
Teitel 2005).
Drumbl (2005, 2007) takes issue with the Western bias of 
the principles of due process and maintains that sentencing 
according to individualized guilt fails to address the collec-
tive nature of international crimes – this being more 
damaging now that international criminal law is increas-
ingly seen as the legitimate response to mass atrocities; 
other context-specific or traditional ways of responding 
(such as reintegration and reconciliation rituals) are 
accepted only as subordinate to international criminal law, 
which alienates victims from the process.
A third approach, closely related to Drumbl’s criticism, 
holds that international trials cannot provide justice for 
victims and highlights contradictions with the other goals 
of international criminal justice. Demands for justice for 
victims played an important part in the negotiations lead-
ing up to the establishment of the ICC. Especially France, 
Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International pushed 
for the incorporation of victim participation in the Rome 
Statute.3 In the words of the French Minister of Justice, 
“The raisons d’être of our fight are the victims.”4 However, 
although victims may also appear as interested parties 
before the ICC, not only to receive reparation but also to 
tell their story, this does not resolve the problem that due 
process traps witnesses between the precise and quantifi-
able evidence required for establishing facts beyond rea-
sonable doubt and the emotive memories inherent in 
victims’ narratives, preventing them from relating their 
experiences in their own words (Haslam 2004, 328) or even 
recognizing them. The narrative of law is inevitably reduc-
tive, not only because of stringent evidential requirements 
but also because, in practice, it is impossible to put the 
combination of every person and factor that contributed to 
the victim’s suffering on trial (Brants 2007).
These criticisms come together in a three-way tension 
between truth-finding through due process that is con-
cerned with establishing the guilt of the accused fairly; 
politically expedient history-telling and developing a col-
lective memory to exorcise the ghosts of the past and make 
a shared future possible; and the needs of victims to share, 
have recognized and redressed their individual experiences 
of suffering. That tension is nowhere more obvious than in 
the role of the victim-witness as it has developed in inter-
national criminal justice, although it has a precedent in the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann.
The secondary role of the Holocaust at Nuremberg was an 
important incentive for Israel to find the masterminds who 
had evaded justice.5 Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped, 
brought to Jerusalem, and charged under Israeli law with, 
inter alia, crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity. He was found guilty and 
hanged. The intention of the Israeli government and the 
prosecutor was, of course, to hold accountable a top Nazi 
who was personally responsible for genocide, but behind 
that lay related aims of putting the Holocaust on the map 
of remembrance, influencing (inter)national public aware-
ness, strengthening the state of Israel politically, and giving 
Jewish victims a voice. Where the Allies relied pre-
dominantly on documentary evidence at Nuremberg, the 
Israeli prosecutor sought a “living record of a gigantic 
human disaster” (Hausner 1966, 303–304), live testimony 
3 On victim participation under the Rome Stat-
ute, see amongst others Groenhuijsen and De 
Brouwer (2008); De Beco (2009); McGonigle (2009).
4 Opening address of Paris Seminar “Access of 
Victims to the International Criminal Court,” Paris, 
April 27, 1999, cited in Haslam (2004).
5 On the Eichmann trial: Hannah Arendt ([1963] 
2003); Gideon Hausner (1966); David Cesarani 
(2005); Harry Mulisch (2005, original in Dutch, 
1961); www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-
adolf/transcripts/Judgment.
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from survivors selected to give the broadest possible his-
torical picture. Eichmann’s judges, however, were resolute 
in what they saw as their core business – and that was not 
history-telling:
[I]t is the purpose of every criminal trial to clarify whether the 
charges in the prosecution’s indictment against the accused 
who is on trial are true, and if the accused is convicted, to mete 
out due punishment to him … [This does] not mean that we 
are unaware of the great educational value, implicit in the very 
holding of this trial, for those who live in Israel as well as for 
those beyond the confines of this state. … Without a doubt, the 
testimony given at this trial by survivors of the Holocaust, who 
poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box, will 
provide valuable material for research workers and historians, 
but as far as this Court is concerned, they are to be regarded as 
by-products of the trial.6
Despite this clear declaration of purpose, the lasting legacy 
of the Eichmann trial for international criminal justice has 
been the importance of history-telling and its demon-
stration that “memory [is] moral in character, and that the 
chief carriers of that message [are] the victims themselves” 
(Winter 2006, 30). Increasingly, the testimony of victim-
survivors is not only a source of moral memory but also 
the basis for the historical narratives that international 
trials produce. But, while many criticize the failure of inter-
national criminal law to provide justice for victims, the 
advent of victim participation at the ICC notwithstanding, 
few have been willing to problematize the role of victims in 
relation to truth and history. As if, given the gravity of the 
crimes and the memory of the Holocaust, inquiring into 
whether a victim-based approach is wholly appropriate in 
the context of international criminal law, somehow implies 
a negation of those crimes and their victims.
Winter (2006, 49) distinguishes between three levels of wit-
nessing: legal, as in giving evidence before an (inter-
national) court against specific perpetrators; moral, 
implying that testimony about specific crimes against 
humanity frames a much wider narrative about absolute 
evil; and the witness as spokesperson for humanity, 
emphasizing that we not only have a duty to remember, but 
also that we forget at our moral peril. All three levels occur 
in trials where crimes against humanity are the issue, and 
their significance lies in their influence on the historical 
and narrative value of investigation and verdict, and the 
production of collective memory. That is the theoretical, 
idealistic view. But historical narrative and collective mem-
ory are constructions that depend on their specific input. 
The way a case is constructed and presented by a pros-
ecutor can influence historical and collective memory in 
several ways and, paradoxically, undermine the very sig-
nificance of witnessing.
The Eichmann-trial made some contemporary com-
mentators uneasy (Cesarani 2005). It was true that it 
reversed the process of “collective world amnesia,” gave 
victims a voice, demonstrated that bearing witness can be a 
reparative act in itself, and that the rule of law triumphed 
over lawlessness.7 But the narrative it produced ignored the 
role of collaborators and bystanders, and the (lack of) 
response by the outside world, including the Jews them-
selves. The Israeli government instructed the prosecutor to 
go easy on West Germany and avoid insulting Chancellor 
Adenauer, and suggested he downplay the failure of the 
Allies to rescue Jews from Europe and highlight the role of 
Arab countries in providing a safe haven for fugitive Nazis 
(Cesarani 2005, 256). The prosecutor relied heavily on sur-
vivors’ testimony, but, heartrending though it was, it was 
piecemeal and inconclusive as victims struggled to 
remember or became confused under cross-examination. 
Although many victims felt vindicated in finally being able 
to tell their story, others were traumatized by the experi-
ence or felt that the court, however empathetic towards the 
witnesses, had not needed their personal memories – 
which was true in the sense that they were often irrelevant 
to the matter in hand: Eichmann’s personal guilt under 
criminal law.
Similar concerns and complaints have been voiced with 
regard to the ad hoc tribunals. Unlike the ICC, victims 
have no particular standing under the International 
6 Judgment, supra, opening passage. 7 Contrary to the defence’s protestations that a 
fair trial was impossible, the court’s handling of the 
case is generally considered exemplary.
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). They 
appear simply as witnesses, although special measures may 
be taken to protect them if necessary and to prevent, as far 
as possible, revictimization through the trauma of testify-
ing or being confronted with their tormentors. Never-
theless, they are a tool in the prosecutor’s strategy to 
deliver both proof beyond reasonable doubt of who was 
responsible and a (political) history of what happened to 
them.
Extending the aims of the truth-finding process beyond the 
question of the defendant’s guilt to the much broader pur-
pose of making sure what happened is not forgotten, with 
victim testimony the primary vehicle of collective memory, 
sets the trial agenda to re-reading the meaning of victims 
and justice and retelling history rather than fair truth-
finding by the court. That the essence and purpose of the 
trial, of fairness even, becomes to accommodate the vic-
tim’s, rather than the defendant’s day in court is pro-
cedurally unacceptable in the context of due process (and 
only a trial that is scrupulously fair can demonstrate that 
civilized values should and can prevail over barbarity). If 
the counter-argument were that it should indeed be the 
victim’s day, then the question arises as to why we should 
have a trial at all and worry whether it is fair. But, even if 
we accept that the magnitude of suffering involved in inter-
national crimes justifies this new victim paradigm, trials 
can only be brought to a successful conclusion by reducing 
the selection of both defendants and charges – and there-
fore victims’ experiences – to manageable proportions that 
need not, probably do not, reflect reality.
Sandvik (2009) points out that there has been a shift from 
collective political struggles seeking agreements on social, 
civil, and political justice at the national level, to judicial 
and individualized formats in the international sphere, 
where individual agency has come to be seen as intrinsic 
to the legitimacy of cosmopolitan justice, namely its abil-
ity to achieve not only reconciliation at a personal and 
national level, healing and dignity, but also to pave the 
way for a truly moral, cosmopolitan world-society. This 
coincides with Winter’s third level of witnessing, but is 
often so at odds with the other goals of international 
criminal justice, including reconciliation and justice for 
victims, that Haslam has called for honest acknowledge-
ment (also by victims) of the limitations on the ability of 
the legal process to restore a victim’s sense of self-respect, 
and for alternative platforms to meet such ends (2004, 
319). So, how do history, memory, and the interests of 
victims fare under one such alternative: truth commis-
sions?
2. Truth Commissions: Nation-Building and Collective Memory
Deeply entwined with the political transition process, truth 
commissions are highly political instruments negotiated 
between countless actors. In recent decades many countries 
have used them to confront the aftermath of violent con-
flict and atrocity.8 In the wake of the authoritarian regimes 
of the 1970s and 1980s, the debate on transitional justice in 
Latin America was driven by intertwined demands for jus-
tice and truth, and the need to legitimize the new govern-
ments. “Truth” in this context was understood as the 
obligation of the successor state to investigate and establish 
the facts about past violations. Although questions about 
whether there was a duty to punish human rights violators 
were debated (Arthur 2009, 353), in the Latin America of 
the 1980s transitional justice centred on achieving two 
aims: some measure of justice for the victims and a more 
just democratic order (Arthur 2009, 355–56). Behind this 
lay the need to establish a nation-building narrative. 
According to Posel, these “previously bitterly and brutally 
divided polities” sought to “refashion themselves as spaces 
of unity and democratic stability.” Here the problem of 
history-writing presented itself in a particular way: how to 
create an “imagined community” of the new democratic 
nation on the strength of an account of the past to which 
previously warring groupings – with disparate, even 
incommensurate, versions of events – would now consent” 
(Posel 2008, 120–21).
8 Worldwide, there have been forty truth commis-
sions, from 1974 (Uganda) to the beginning of 2010 
(Kenya) (Hayner 2011, 256).
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In 1995 the South African Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission was installed, with according to Hayner (2011, 26) 
“the most complex and sophisticated mandate for any 
truth commission to date.” A key feature that set it apart 
from earlier truth commissions (besides its much larger 
reach in terms of mandate, personnel, and funds) were the 
public hearings of both victims and perpetrators and the 
possibility to grant individualized amnesty. For the first 
time, a truth commission’s work took place in front of live, 
television, and radio audiences. “For many, these public 
hearings were the commission” (Cole 2007, 167–68).
2.1. Victims, Testimony, and Collective Memory
The primary function of a truth commission is to collect 
testimony and publish an official record of the past, a pub-
lic recognition of past (state) violence, while also offering 
recommendations to the transitional or successor govern-
ment (Laplante and Theidon 2007, 235). This approach 
aims to present the nation with a history that places past 
events in an understandable story, a master narrative of the 
conflict (Phelps 2004, 79). The place of the victim is cen-
tral. According to Joseph Slaughter (1997, 407), “human 
rights violations target the voice, and therefore, the voice 
should be the focus of international human rights instru-
ments.” There is a general consensus in the literature that 
the importance of a truth commission lies in providing an 
official arena and producing a report that acknowledges 
victims’ voices and endows them with official authority 
vis-à-vis the nation and the world.
The many critical questions that have arisen concern the 
limitations of that platform. Wilson (2001) and Grandin 
(2005) for example show how the human rights discourse 
shapes both form and content of the testimonies given 
before it and the official identity of the testifiers, while 
truth-finding can also become subordinated to “the over-
riding nation-building objective” of the new regime (Wil-
son 2001, 34). Questions about the historical and political 
context of the conflict, the parties and groups involved, and 
past and present socio-economic differences and power 
relations are left out. The discourse on individual human 
rights violations and the focus on the “victim” obscure 
stories of social and political agency and the collective 
dimension of the repression; Robben (2010a, 52) has 
argued that TRCs should take care not to neglect “antagon-
istic social identities.” Others maintain there is little scien-
tific evidence for the assumption that truth-telling before a 
truth commission is either healing or cathartic (Hayner 
2011, 5) and that there is a need for reparations after the act 
of truth-telling (Laplante and Theidon 2007; Shaw 2007).
Some authors take issue with the phenomenon of “testi-
mony.” “Society wants to use witnesses’ accounts as evi-
dence, and testimonies are condemned in case they do not 
match evidence collected by other means” (Strejilevich 
2006, 703). The academic and legal apparatus requires sys-
tematization of testimonies to make them legible, to lit-
erally make them make sense, corresponding with the idea 
that a testimony is a fixed and repeatable story based on 
facts. In the legal context of evidence, this is of crucial 
importance. However, a survivor’s testimony is expressed 
before multiple audiences. Testimonies do not exist in “a 
primordially ‘authentic’ form” (French 2009, 98). Inevi-
tably there will be disjunctions between the narratives of 
those who testify before a truth commission and what the 
commission eventually relates in its report.
Phelps argues that truth commissions can help give voice 
to those who were muted and excluded during the period 
of repression, depending on how those voices are used in 
relation to what she calls the master narrative. She asks 
how individual stories can be contextualized without 
reducing them to “examples” or “evidence.” Her answer is 
that individual voices should be allowed to compete. “We 
can only know the past through many competing nar-
ratives, and we can only envision the future by incorporat-
ing this polyphony into the new national story” (Phelps 
2004, 127). This goes against the grain of many truth com-
missions which seek a coherent and unequivocal official 
narrative.
We now turn to the Chilean National Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (1991) and the National Commission 
on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2004), which each 
had a distinct legal focus and attempted to derive an objec-
tive official narrative on the dictatorial past while recogniz-
ing persons who were assassinated or disappeared, or 
suffered political imprisonment and torture as individual 
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victims. Neither of the commissions held public hearings 
and, in that sense, they lacked the performativity and pub-
lic, emotive dimension that the South African TRC so 
clearly had (although the 1991 Chilean Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission served as an example and inspiration 
for the TRC). Nevertheless, we believe that in their wider 
social impact they are highly illustrative of a more general 
effect of truth commissions on collective processes of 
memory-formation and history telling.
2.2. The Chilean Truth Commissions: Contesting the Official Narrative
After seventeen years, the Chilean dictatorship was nar-
rowly defeated at the ballot box in 1988.9 Although the 
theme of human rights violations loomed large at the time, 
a political and legal reality still dominated by actors and 
laws of the dictatorship made thorough investigation of the 
crimes difficult. Truth and “national reconciliation,” not 
criminal justice, became the stepping stones from violent 
past to new democracy. In April 1990, newly elected Presi-
dent Aylwin created the Chilean National Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission (also known as the Rettig 
Commission after its president, lawyer Raúl Rettig).10
The Commission’s mandate was to establish the most com-
plete picture possible of the grave human rights violations 
committed between September 11, 1973, and March 11, 
1990. It recognized individual victims “on both sides”: the 
detained-disappeared,11 the executed, and those who died 
under torture, at the hands of state agents or people in its 
service (2,025 persons), and those who were kidnapped or 
suffered an attack on their lives carried out by “individuals 
acting under political pretexts” (90 cases). Moreover, the 
Commission recommended reparations and measures to 
ensure “never again.” Its mandate prohibited the Commis-
sion from pronouncing on possible individual (criminal) 
responsibility. For an entity with no judicial powers, the 
Rettig Commission operated with remarkably rigorous legal 
criteria and legal tone. It was to be neutral and objective, 
emphasizing its position of impartiality in an attempt to 
forge political and social consensus on the recent past.
In June 1990, members of the victims’ families were invited 
by the commission to testify. They were also asked to pres-
ent persons who had witnessed what had happened to their 
relatives, and written proof of the actions they themselves 
had undertaken before the courts and human rights organ-
izations to find their loved ones. The Commission received 
around 3,400 cases (CNVR 1991, 5–6) and heard all family 
members who so requested. Due to time constraints it was 
only possible to interview those witnesses considered most 
relevant and not included in other sources (CNRV 1991, 9).
The Rettig Report described the development of the 
regime’s repressive tactics chronologically, presenting the 
individual cases throughout the text and recognizing in 
total 2,298 victims. The Commission’s mandate, however, 
severely limited the official narrative: it did not focus on 
perpetrators, and recognized a specifically defined group of 
individual victims of human rights violations by the dicta-
torship, those who either died or were disappeared. Phelps 
has argued that because there were no living victims 
included in the report the victims’ stories were necessarily 
told by the Rettig Report’s authors, and became subsumed 
into the master narrative (Phelps 2004, 93) which was 
geared at “national reconciliation.”12 As a result, no perpe-
trators were named and victim-survivors were neither rec-
ognized as victims nor given a voice. As an expression of 
the power relations in the early 1990s, the mandate shows 
the limits of what was possible at the time in a careful bal-
ancing of demands, interests, and restraints.
Although the Rettig Report was crucial in officially 
acknowledging the repression and suffering under the mili-
tary regime, family members and human rights organiz-
ations found its “truth” unsatisfactory. In countless 
commemorative acts, meetings, and protests, and by con-
9 This section is based on doctoral research by 
Katrien Klep in Santiago de Chile.
10 Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, 
Supreme Decree 335. The Report was published in 
March 1991. Ley de Reparación 19.123 (8 February 
1992) granted reparation payments to the families of 
victims recognized by the Report.
11 In Chile the term detenidos desaparecidos is used 
to refer to those who fell in the hands of the military 
dictatorship and literally disappeared without any 
information about their fate or whereabouts. See 
also CNVR 1991, 22–23). We use “the detained-dis-
appeared” as the closest English equivalent.
12 For a comparison of the position of the victims 
and their testimonies in the Argentinean and Chi-
lean truth commissions see Robben (2010b).
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tinuous efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, they pres-
ented their own demands for truth and justice. They not 
only had a truth to tell that had been obscured and denied 
under the dictatorship they helped bring to light, they also 
needed to know the truth, or at least that part of the truth to 
which they had no access: what happened to the detained-
disappeared, and where were they now? They also wanted 
criminal justice for those responsible. Moreover, the Rettig 
Report, although mentioning torture as an element of 
repression, did not individually recognize the tens of thou-
sands of Chileans who had suffered political imprisonment, 
torture, dismissal on political grounds, and exile.
In a drastically changed political landscape, President Lagos 
created the National Commission on Political Detention 
and Torture in 2003 (also known as the Valech Commission 
after its president Monsignor Sergio Valech), with a view to 
reparation of the victims.13 Its mandate was “to determine, 
based on the antecedents presented, who suffered depriva-
tion of liberty and who was tortured for political reasons by 
agents of the state or persons in the service of the state, 
during the period between September 11, 1973, and March 
11, 1990” (translated from CNPPT 2004, 21). 
The Valech Report, like the Rettig Report, describes the 
periods of repression and includes a chapter listing the dif-
ferent torture methods in detail; testimonies are not repro-
duced completely although there are anonymous quotes 
and excerpts. An important part of the report is dedicated 
to listing 1,132 precincts where people were detained 
throughout Chile during the dictatorship: precincts of the 
different branches of the armed forces, quarters of the 
(civil) police, boats, sport stadiums, prison camps, jails, and 
secret detention and torture centres of the secret service 
(CNPPT 2004, 261–466). Of the almost 35,000 persons 
who applied to the Commission, 27,255 were recognized as 
having been imprisoned and tortured for political reasons; 
their names are all mentioned in the report.
The Valech Report broadened the official narrative of the 
military dictatorship in that it offered more detail than the 
Rettig Report on the specific forms of repression of 
imprisonment and torture. Moreover, it delved deeper into 
the victims’ political and social engagement, making it 
explicit that they were persecuted for their political and 
social ideas. It recognizes the victim-survivors of political 
imprisonment and torture individually but, like the Rettig 
Report, names no perpetrators; testimonies will remain 
secret for fifty years to come, even for the courts.
There is no doubt that both the Rettig and Valech Commis-
sions, through their carefully constructed narratives, were 
of crucial importance in promoting broad acknowledg-
ment of the predicament of the victims in Chilean society 
and in bringing their testimonies into the public sphere. 
Yet, it is exactly this shaping of witness-testimonies into an 
authoritative narrative of individual victims of human 
rights violations that has also led victim-survivors, human 
rights organizations, and others to press on for truth and 
justice. With their strict mandates, legal language, and 
focus on hard facts, the reports led victim-survivors to seek 
to establish a different kind of collective memory of the 
dictatorship, in which witnesses are not just victims but 
also political and social agents. These processes have led to 
many public manifestations of memory in memorials, 
monuments, and the creation of visitors centres in former 
torture and detention centres, while survivors and human 
rights lawyers continue their fight against impunity (perpe-
trators of crimes during the military regime are still being 
brought before the Chilean courts).14
3. History-Telling and the Limitations of Legal Space
Per definition, both courts and truth commissions engage 
in history-telling: the establishment of an authoritative 
narrative of past events is part and parcel of their remit. 
The creation of a truth commission and the historical nar-
rative related in its report reflect the power relations in the 
13 Comisión Nacional sobre Prisón Politica y Tor-
tura, Supreme Decree 1.040. The Report was pub-
lished in November 2004. Ley de Reparación 19.992 
(24 December 2004) granted reparation payments to 
the victim-survivors recognized by the Report.
14 Collins (2008, 20) argues that “[T]he transi-
tional school of thought, which grew out of the 
Latin American experiences of transition in the 
1980s, underestimated the extent to which questions 
of criminal and civil responsibility for state crimes 
of torture, disappearance, and genocide would per-
sist and eventually resurface in postconflict 
societies”, see also Collins 2010.
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country concerned, for the public debates surrounding the 
installation, functioning, and results of a commission are 
part and parcel of the truth-finding exercise with which it 
is concerned. That is perhaps more obvious in the case of a 
national truth commission, where there is a closeness and 
immediacy that is absent in the context of international 
courts. But there too, the political-historical roots involve 
many actors and produce mandates that shape not only 
proceedings and outcome, but also the “historical truth” 
that is globally disseminated through the verdict.
History-telling, however, is not only determined by the 
historical events and political processes that gave rise to 
the particular instrument of transitional justice con-
cerned, but also by the goals and procedures of those 
instruments that make up the legal space in which history-
telling takes place. Here, victim-witnesses have become a 
crucial source of history and collective memory. From the 
person who experienced a crime and can testify to the 
identity of its perpetrator and the manner and circum-
stances of its occurrence, “the victim” – an abstract entity 
– has become the spokesperson for humankind whose tes-
timony is a moral necessity: “lest we forget.” From the 
ubiquitous perspective of human rights discourse which 
informs the goals of transitional justice and is moreover 
transitional in another sense – namely a step on the cos-
mopolitan road to a truly human, global society – this is 
precisely as it should be.
However, the construction of victim-testimony in verdicts 
and reports is also the message that an international crimi-
nal court or truth commission broadcasts, and transitional 
justice selectively and deliberately endows victims of 
human rights violations with differentiated forms of sub-
jectivity, envisioning a certain type of survivor (Sandvik 
2009). Cosmopolitan imageries of suffering are both cre-
ated and used by international courts, to establish their 
legitimacy and to underline their message to the world. 
Likewise, national truth commissions shape victim-testi-
mony to “fit” what they (or their remit) regard as the 
demands of a viable national future. In both cases, victim-
witnesses (and perpetrators) are constructed procedurally 
as a category from whom a certain legal performance is 
expected. But that is to ignore the contradictions and prob-
lems inherent in the legal space that procedures of transi-
tional justice provide.
As legal instruments, both truth commissions and inter-
national criminal courts (must) regard the victim-witness 
as instrumental to their own processes and goals. Victims 
see those processes as instrumental in the alleviation of 
their own suffering and/or as means to recover the voice 
lost in victimhood. The latter may or may not overlap 
with the discourse of the victim as spokesperson for 
humankind, about which Winter (2006, 241–42) has 
remarked that, ethically it is the testimony that matters, 
not the instrumental uses to which it is put. That is a suc-
cinct description of the problem of history-telling 
through witness testimony in the context of what, after 
all, are instruments of a legal process of justice in which 
testimony is, by definition, instrumental. There is how-
ever a difference between the legal space that inter-
national criminal courts allot to the testimony of 
victim-witnesses and the legal space for testimony 
allotted by truth commissions, and the manner in which 
that space is restricted by the other goals of these different 
instruments of transitional justice.
3.1. International Criminal Courts: Doing Justice to Mass Atrocity
If the aims of international criminal justice are “as ambi-
tious as they are contradictory” (Alvarez 2004, 321–22) and 
are discussed and criticized at length, the primary purpose 
of an international criminal trial (any criminal trial for that 
matter) – to establish the guilt of the perpetrator beyond 
reasonable doubt in a fair manner – is often overlooked. 
Yet this is precisely what delineates the legal procedural 
space of an international trial, within which all other goals 
must be achieved. This will remain inherently problematic 
unless we relinquish either the idea that crimes against 
humanity deserve to be punished under criminal law, or 
that such punishment is legitimate only after the establish-
ment of guilt according to due process. Otherwise, there 
are limits – whatever the needs of victims.
Inevitably the narrative of crime will be reduced to a few 
provable sound-bites, in many ways devaluing the victim’s 
experience by taking individual culpability out of the con-
text of the historical reality. No trial of an individual mur-
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derer can ever do justice to the experience of mass atrocity. 
Indeed, an individual does not “commit” such crimes in 
any normal sense of the word. They are collective, political, 
and social-psychological events involving a society as a 
whole. What any individual did personally is only a very 
small part of how such events developed and essentially 
unimportant in explaining or understanding them; but it is 
the only thing that matters in a criminal trial. Eichmann’s 
final defence that he was expatiating “the guilt of the 
epoch” was in a sense true, but irrelevant.
That truth-finding by an international criminal court is, of 
necessity, related to personal guilt, also has repercussions 
for the value of that “truth” as history and its contribution 
to reconciliation. Even if the court manages to create “a 
coherent and judicially manageable narrative,” inter-
national trials can only stop denial; they cannot impose 
shared remembering. “Justice will also serve the interests of 
truth. But the truth will not necessarily be believed, and it 
is putting too much faith in truth to believe that it can 
heal” (Ignatieff 1997, 15). Indeed, the very form of an 
adversarial trial, with its primary aim of establishing indi-
vidual guilt, puts victims and perpetrators on either sides 
of a black and white divide that – given the shades of grey 
that characterize the collective nature of mass atrocities – is 
neither a “true” version of events nor a promising starting 
point for reconciliation and a tenable future. 
3.2. History-Telling Beyond Truth Commissions
It has been argued that truth commissions are more 
suited than criminal trials to make possible a detailed 
analysis of the past and creating a national narrative that 
can be used broadly in society (Minow 2008, 180). It is 
true that they can publicly acknowledge and condemn the 
violent past. They can also examine the role of multiple 
sectors and actors, and stimulate debate. However, while 
they do not “suffer” from the overwhelming constraint of 
having to establish individual guilt within the strict limits 
of due process, whether or not they succeed in promoting 
peace, justice, and reconciliation depends on the commis-
sion’s mandate and procedures, the way testimonies are 
woven into the official narrative, and the interaction 
between the way that the narrative is presented to, and 
received in, society.
The very public South African TRC as well as the much 
more closed Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (Rettig Commission) and National Com-
mission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Valech 
Commission) can all be said to have a “cultural afterlife” 
(Robins 2007) in which their narratives, ambiguities, and 
silences are engaged and contested. In Chile, the reports 
of both commissions strove for an objective, abstract, 
and closed narrative, framed in terms of the inter-
national human rights discourse. Family members, vic-
tim-survivors, and others engaged tirelessly in cultural, 
social, legal, and political contestation and negotiation of 
the official narrative, broadening the understanding of 
the military dictatorship and opening up other spaces for 
a much wider range of testimonies and memories in Chi-
lean society. Here, not before the commissions, we find a 
public emotive and performative dimension of the Chi-
lean processes of memorialization. This is the more 
remarkable given that the hearings before the Chilean 
commissions were closed to the public, while those of 
the South African TRC were broadcast on national radio 
and television.
As in Chile, the South African TRC did not reveal “the 
whole truth” nor reconcile the entire nation. “The TRC’s 
successes as a state ritual were largely a result of the creative 
tension between its ambitious efforts to establish a totalis-
ing, nation-building discourse, and the contestations, 
ambiguities and contradictions that this process 
unleashed” (Robins 2007, 146). Cole (1997, 187) concludes 
that, “[I]n the disjunctions between participants’ perform-
ances of truth they wished to perform and the commis-
sion’s public iteration of the truth it wished to perform, we 
come closest to perceiving the complexity of the knowledge 
the TRC brought into being.” That complexity is also evi-
dent in the space created in South African literature and art 
to touch upon silences and unspoken aspects of the past 
and to critique the TRC and its truth production (Gready 
2009). Lisa Laplante (2007, 435) underlines the importance 
of both voice and agency when she draws attention to the 
act of truth-telling in the context of the Peruvian TRC: 
“Importantly, this desire to tell is accompanied by a need to 
be protagonists in telling. … it is the change in personal 
and political status as truth-tellers, and not just the content 
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of this truth, that makes memory projects important 
endeavours” (italics in the original).
3.3. Conclusion
The current victim-oriented paradigm of transitional jus-
tice asserts that the (hi)story of the suffering of victims is 
paramount to establishing a shared – moral – memory that 
serves the demands of a stable and democratic future and 
at the same time does justice to the victims themselves. Yet, 
precisely because this historical narrative is couched in 
terms of gross violations of individual human rights and 
also aims at nation-building, in practice it inevitably dis-
torts the historical “reality” of collective mass atrocities 
and the victims’ remembered experiences of it. That is true 
of both international criminal courts and truth commis-
sions.
However, because the legal space that truth commissions 
can provide for history-telling is flexible and their reports, 
though authoritative, open to public debate, they also 
encourage competing public and private discourses in 
alternative public spaces where that debate can be con-
ducted and the master narrative contested. It is perhaps 
this aspect that completes their role as history-tellers and 
allows them to promote a shared memory of the past: his-
tory-telling and the promotion of collective memory is not 
the prerogative of historians, but takes place in all of the 
public and private spheres of society.
A truth commission’s report opens opportunities for vic-
tims that the verdict of a court would be expected to 
close. In that sense, truth commissions offer empower-
ment in ways in which an international criminal court 
never can; they also allow for the development of compet-
ing theatres of memory, leaving room for other voices that 
may differ and even oppose the official historical nar-
rative. The legal truth, laid down in the rulings of an 
international criminal court is, by definition, not open-
ended. The verdict of a court is definite and authoritative; 
in this context, closure, not continued debate about what 
it has established as the truth, is its one and only purpose 
– indeed, on this its legitimacy depends. But then, also by 
definition, its contribution to history-telling, collective 
memory, and justice for victims is limited indeed. All of 
this is not to say that truth commissions are better than 
international criminal trials, for it should not be forgotten 
that trials offer an end to impunity and retribution in 
ways that truth commissions never can. Only that they are 
different, and that each has its own, limited role to play in 
transitional justice.
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